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Traditionally, protective schemes in the laws of war are tightly coupled to
rigid status categories.1 The contours of these status categories (and the content of
corresponding protective schemes) reflect the dual normative commitments of this
body of law: military necessity and humanitarianism. Formal protection varies
along a number of axes (including combatant status, nationality, territory, and the
character of the conflict) because it is thought that these factors roughly track the
vulnerability of and the security challenges posed by specific status groups. In
early law of war treaties, specific status categories are defined in terms that
†
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1
The “laws of war” encompass two distinct bodies of rules: the jus ad bellum—rules
governing when uses of force are lawful; and the jus in bello—rules governing the conduct of war.
“International humanitarian law” refers to the corpus of jus in bello (and perhaps some rules—
such as the prohibitions on “genocide” and “crimes against humanity”—formally outside the jus in
bello. The jus in bello itself has two principal subdivisions: “Geneva law” and “Hague law.”
Geneva law, embodied principally in the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and the two 1977
Additional Protocols, prescribes an extensive body of detailed rules governing the treatment of the
victims of armed conflict. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31
[hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention III or GPW]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention IV or GC]. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec.
12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts,
opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II]. Hague law, embodied
principally in the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, govern the means and methods of warfare,
tactics and the general conduct of hostilities. See, e.g., Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631 (Hague
Regulations are annexed to the Convention) [hereinafter Hague Regulations or Hague
Convention].
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encourage protection-seeking states (and at times individuals) to orient their
behavior in ways that promote the objectives of humanitarian law. Protection, in
these treaties, is a carrot for rule-regarding behavior—harsh, summary treatment
at the hands of the enemy, the stick. Such an approach, by design, includes
coverage gaps.
Beginning with the 1949 Geneva Conventions, this understanding of status
has been in decline. Over the last half century, protective schemes have converged
and coverage gaps have closed. From the “human rights” perspective, these
developments are all to the good. The “humanization of humanitarian law”
reflects the progressive trajectory of international law in which universal human
rights trump parochial state interests.2 From the “traditionalist” perspective, the
law of war has lost its compass. Protection of unlawful combatants (1)
undermines the humanitarian ambitions of the law of war by compromising the
protection of innocent civilians; and (2) undermines political and institutional
support for the law of war by imposing on states obligations that are inconsistent
with various security imperatives. Both views are flawed. Protection should,
contra the “human rights” view, accommodate the realities of the battlefield. On
the other hand, humane treatment of the enemy, irrespective of pre-capture
conduct, furthers the military objectives of the capturing state.
My argument is that humanitarian protection in time of war should not
vary by detainee status category—what I will call “protective parity.” The paper
has a descriptive and a prescriptive dimension. Through an analysis of the legal
situation of unlawful combatants, I illustrate that (1) protective schemes are
converging; and (2) although the protective significance of POW status is
declining, there are some persistent gaps in coverage.
The unique protective significance of POW status (and the claims that
justify this extra increment of protection) suggests that POWs are systematically
over-protected (even if only to a modest extent) and unlawful combatants are
systematically under-protected. To make this case, I offer a cluster of offensive
claims and one defensive claim. On the offensive side, I argue that various claims
for expanding or contracting humanitarian protection do not track status
categories. In this way, the claims that undergird these ostensibly competing
schools of thought support “protective parity.” Consider the following related
points. If protective schemes compromise legitimate security interests (think of
the policy arguments advanced by the United States to justify its treatment of the
detainees in Cuba), then some status categories (e.g., POWs) are systematically
2

See Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 96 AMER. J. INT’L L.
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over-protected. That is, these security-based claims, if valid, would apply
irrespective of whether the detainees were properly classified as POWs or not. If
humane treatment of the enemy increases battlefield effectiveness (because poor
treatment discourages surrender, encourages reprisals, decreases troop morale,
and decreases political support for the war effort), then some status categories
(e.g., unlawful combatants) are systematically under-protected.
On the defensive side, I argue that “protective parity” is consistent with
the principle of distinction. Even if “irregularization” undermines distinction, the
question is how best to encourage fighters to distinguish themselves from the
civilian population. I maintain that protective status categories are an inefficient
way to incentivize individual combatants because these categories necessarily
trade on collective considerations—such as the organizational characteristics of
the fighting force. The rule of distinction would be better served by an
individualized “war crimes” approach that accorded all fighters substantial
humanitarian protection and punished (in accord with basic requirements of due
process) individual bad actors.

I. THE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF STATUS CATEGORIES IN THE LAW OF WAR
Individual status categories have played an important role in the laws of
war. The scope and content of protective schemes have traditionally turned on
whether affected persons are properly classified as “combatants,” “noncombatants,” “prisoners of war,” or “civilians.” Why this is so requires some
explanation. The jus in bello governs the conduct of war (rather than the legality
or legitimacy of the war itself); and is, in this sense, a second-best
humanitarianism. Its rules promote humanitarian values within a context most
inhospitable to such values: large scale, organized hostilities. Given this
limitation, the law of war seeks to define and eliminate “unnecessary” suffering
(and devastation) in time of war. Three types of rules promote this objective: (1)
rules governing who and what may be attacked; (2) rules governing the means
and methods used in executing lawful attacks; and (3) rules governing the
treatment of persons subject to the authority of the enemy (e.g., persons captured
and detained in time of war). Status categories play a central (though somewhat
different) role all three regimes.
Type-1 rules build on a distinction between military targets and civilian
targets—only the former may be made the object of an attack.3 Therefore, persons
3

See, e.g., Protocol I, supra note ___, arts. 49-50; see also JUDITH GAIL GARDAM,
NONCOMBATANT IMMUNITY AS A NORM OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (1993).
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properly classified as “civilians” enjoy “non-combatant immunity” from attack.4
This is not to say that any attack resulting in the death of civilians is unlawful—
the law prohibits directing attacks against civilians as such.
Type-2 rules, in part, build on the distinction between military and civilian
targets—prohibiting means and methods that cause death and destruction
disproportionate to the concrete military advantage issuing from the attack.5 Once
again, the objectives of the law of war (and the interests it seeks to protect)
require categorization of targets (including persons)—targets are assigned a status
that determines the scope and content of protection accorded that potential target.
Type-3 rules are similar in some respects but also importantly different.
These rules, embodied principally in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their
protocols, protect persons no longer participating in the hostilities who have been
made subject to the authority of the enemy.6 For example, the prisoner-of-war
Convention protects persons captured and detained by the enemy.7 Given the
scope of their application, these rules (as a conceptual matter) do not rely upon
the distinction between “military” and “civilian.” Nevertheless, these rules do
apportion humanitarian protection along rigid status categories. Each treaty
defines, with some precision, the categories of persons protected by it. Why this is
so is less clear. Protection is apportioned across status categories even though the
distinctions between these categories do not directly serve the objectives of
Geneva law. These status categories—most importantly, “prisoner of war” and
“civilian”— are defined so as to incentivize various actors (collective and
individual) to promote the overall policy objectives of the law of war. That is,
protection is offered as a carrot to encourage rule-regarding and rule-promoting
conduct at the organizational and individual level. The protection accorded by
Type-3 rules (Geneva law) is extended as a carrot to induce behavior that
promotes the objectives of Type-1 and Type-2 rules (Hague law).
This point requires some clarification. Consider type-1 rules in more
detail. The law of war requires that attacks be directed only against valid military
targets. Therefore, no attack may be directed against civilians or civilian
4

See, e.g., Protocol I, supra note ___, arts. 49-50; see also GARDAM, supra note ___..
See, e.g., Protocol I, supra note ___, arts. 51-52; see also A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE
BATTLEFIELD 14-19 (1996).
6
GPW, supra note [1], art. 4 (protecting specific categories of persons captured and
detained by enemy forces); GC, supra note [1], art. 4 (protecting persons “who, at a given moment
and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of
a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals”); see also JEAN
PICTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 29-49 (1985).
7
GPW, supra note [1], art. 4.
5
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objects—even if doing so would serve the military interests of the attacking force.
The law of war, in this sense, is predicated on the distinction between military and
civilian objects. One important incidence of this general distinction is the
distinction between combatants and non-combatants. Under the law of war, only
combatants may be made the object of an attack, so as to spare the latter, as much
as possible, the ravages of war. Non-combatants are granted immunity from
attack so long as they do not participate directly in the hostilities. In this sense, the
protection of non-combatants from attack is predicated on a clear distinction
between combatants and non-combatants. If attacking forces cannot distinguish
between enemy soldiers and civilians, this type of rule cannot work well. If socalled irregular fighters—those not part of the regular armed forces—are “lawful”
combatants, then the distinction between soldier and civilian is blurred. It is the
goal of protecting innocent civilians that requires a sharp line between combatants
and non-combatants. The upshot is that “regularization” of armed forces is
essential to the proper functioning of Hague law.
Of course, it does not necessarily follow from this point that irregular
fighters should be denied humanitarian protection upon capture. Indeed, there are
at least two ways to understand the relationship between Hague law (Types-1 and
-2 rules) and Geneva law (Type-3 rules). On the one hand, the regimes could be
completely decoupled. That is, Geneva law need not have any structural
relationship to Hague law. On this view, all persons captured in time of war are
entitled to humanitarian protection irrespective of whether their war-time conduct
transgressed the rule of distinction. I will call this view, the “human rights” view.
Or, as previously described, Geneva law could be oriented in such a way as to
induce regularization of armed forces. To do so, Geneva law would delimit the
categories of individuals qualifying for protection. On this view, post-capture
protections would extend to two groups: those who do not fight (non-combatants);
and those who fight in forces that are sufficiently regularized (lawful combatants).
“Irregulars”—the residual category of so-called unlawful combatants—
would enjoy no protection. The idea is to deter “irregularization” by threatening
the denial of any rights-bearing status. In the Hague Conventions of 1907, the
“rights and obligations” of war extended only to those combatants satisfying the
four criteria of regularization: operate under a responsible command structure;
wear a fixed, distinctive emblem visible at a distance; carry arms openly; and
conduct their operations in accordance with the laws of war. The 1929 and 1949
Geneva Conventions on the Protection of Prisoners of War, drawing on this
tradition, defined the category of persons protected by it in roughly the same
terms. This “traditionalist” perspective suggests that denial of POW status leaves
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captured combatants largely unprotected by humanitarian law.8 In one influential
writer’s view, such persons were placed upon capture at the mercy of the
detaining power.9
8

See U.S. Dep’t of War, Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United
States in the Field by Order of the Secretary of War, General Orders No. 100, art. LVII (1863);
Capt. Michael W. Brough, The POW in a Time of Terrorism: An Investigation into Moral Status,
in JSCOPE 2003: JOINT SERVICES CONFERENCE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (2003), available at
<http://www.usafa.af.mil/jscope/JSCOPE03/Brough03.html> (“Captured combatants who are not
POWs are devoid of GC protection, and they are at the mercy of the Detaining Power. The
Detaining Power may agree to treat the captives as if they were POWs (as President Bush declared
he would do for Afghan detainees), but they are not bound by international agreement to do so . . .
.”); COLM MCKEOGH, INNOCENT CIVILIANS: THE MORALITY OF KILLING IN WAR 137 (2002)
(“The formal approach to combatancy of the Hague Regulations yielded a clear delineation of the
categories of combatant and civilian. However, this clear delineation also meant that there was a
gap between the two lawful categories of combatant and civilian. There was a third category of
person in war: the unlawful combatant. Those who did not abide by the rules set out in the [Hague
Regulations defining lawful combatants] were unlawful combatants and were accorded no
protection.”) (emphasis added); INGRID DETTER, THE LAW OF WAR 148 (2nd ed. 2000) (“Unlawful
combatants . . . though they are a legitimate target for any belligerent action, are not, if captured,
entitled to any prisoner of war status. . . . They are often summarily tried and enjoy no protection
under international law.”); G.I.A.D. Draper, The Status of Combatants and the Question of
Guerilla Warfare, in REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND ARMED CONFLICTS 206, 208 (Michael A. Meyer
& Hilaire McCoubrey, eds. 1998) (“Civilians participating in combat ceased to be immune from
attack. They might be killed in combat, and, on capture, were liable to be treated as marauders and
executed summarily at the discretion of the captor commander. . . .[T]heir very participation,
however conducted, was in itself a violation of the law of war, or, alternatively, conduct that put
them outside its protection and left them at the mercy of the enemy.”); Richard R. Baxter, The
Duties of Combatants and the Conduct of Hostilities (Law of the Hague), in INTERNATIONAL
DIMENSIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW 93, 105-06 (1988) (arguing that unlawful combatants “upon
capture were not entitled to be treated either as prisoners of war or as peaceful civilians;” and that
they “fell outside the protected categories . . . .”); GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, II INTERNATIONAL
LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
115-117 (1968) (arguing that unprivileged belligerents are in the same position as “spies,” and as
such, entitled only to the “minimum requirements imposed by the standard of civilization”—
which he suggests includes the right to “a [standardless] trial”); JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS
ON INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 549 (1954) (maintaining that the distinction between
unprivileged and privileged combatants “draws the line between those personnel who, on capture,
are entitled under international law to certain minimal treatment as prisoners of war, and those not
entitled to such protection. ‘Noncombatants’ who engaged in hostilities are one of the classes
deprived of such protection . . . . Such unprivileged belligerents, though not condemned by
international law, are not protected by it, but are left to the discretion of the belligerent threatened
by their activities.”); II OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW: DISPUTES, WAR, AND NEUTRALITY
256 (H. Lauterpacht, ed. 1948) (arguing that unlawful combatants are “likely to be treated as war
criminals, and shot.”); J.M. SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND 37 (1911) (“[W]ar law has a short
shrift for the non-combatant who violates its principles by taking up arms.”); id. at 35-72
(outlining long history of summary treatment accorded unlawful combatants). EMMERICH DE
VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 481 (Luke White, ed. 1792) (“A nation attacked by such sort of
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This is not to say that the 1949 Geneva Conventions (and certainly not the
1977 protocols thereto) take this approach. Indeed, in my view, they do so only to
a limited extent. As I demonstrate more fully in Part II, the 1949 Geneva
Conventions—though they draw on many structural features of traditional law of
war treaties—lay the foundations for the “human rights” perspective that so
clearly predominates in the 1977 protocols (and other important developments in
humanitarian law). The Geneva Civilians Convention accords substantial
protection, which tracks closely the protection accorded under the POW
Convention, to all enemy nationals who have “fallen into the hands of the
enemy.” Moreover, the Civilians Convention expressly applies to “unlawful
combatants”—authorizing states in such cases to derogate, where necessary for
security reasons, from certain rights recognized in the treaty. Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions, Article 75 of Additional Protocol I, and the
procedural rights regime embedded in the Conventions’ grave breach regime
provide important humanitarian protections to persons subject to the authority of
the enemy—without regard to the “status” or pre-capture behavior of the
individual in question.
These developments, without question, have blunted the sharp edge of
status determinations. Nevertheless, they have not eliminated the protective
consequences of status in the law of war. Only prisoners of war are entitled to
combatant immunity—the rule that lawful combatants may not be subject to
criminal prosecution for their very participation in the hostilities; and only POWs
enjoy so-called “assimilation rights”—the rule requiring that lawful combatants
be accorded the same rights as members of the detaining state’s armed forces. In
addition, the application of the Civilians Convention to unlawful combatants is
conditioned by Article 5 which authorizes states to restrict detainee rights where
necessary to protect state security. Finally, the gap-filling provisions—Common
enemies [unlawful combatants] is not under any obligation to observe towards them the rules of
wars in form.”).
9
Richard R. Baxter, So-Called “Unprivileged Belligerency”: Spies, Guerrillas, and
Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 321, 328 (1952). Baxter concluded:
The correct legal formulation is, it is submitted, that armed and unarmed
hostilities, wherever occurring, committed by persons other than those entitled
to be treated as prisoners of war or peaceful civilians merely deprive such
individuals of a protection they might otherwise enjoy under international law
and place them virtually at the power of the enemy. . . . International law
deliberately neglects to protect unprivileged belligerents because of the danger
their acts present to their opponents. . . . [Privileged belligerents] have a
protected status upon capture, whilst other belligerents not so identified do not
benefit from any comprehensive scheme of protection.
Id. at 343.
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Article 3 and Article 75 of AP I—do not provide a comprehensive protective
scheme. In short, coverage gaps have narrowed, but nevertheless persist.
The question is how best to evaluate these developments. From the
traditionalist perspective, they are counter-productive in that they erode the
distinction between combatant and non-combatant by undermining the incentive
structure of the law of war. From the human rights perspective, however, these
developments represent a sensible compromise between humanitarian values and
military necessity. As suggested in the Introduction, both views are unpersuasive.
Note initially that both views calibrate treatment by combatant status category.
Clearly this is so for the traditionalist view but it is also true for the human rights
perspective. Contemporary Geneva law, even in its most progressive moments,
does not contemplate “protective parity” across status categories.10 The primary
reason for this is simple: graduated protective schemes, it is thought, promote
humanitarian values by reinforcing the principle of distinction.
In this Article, I reexamine the assumptions embedded in this bit of
conventional wisdom. In doing so, I ask what work we might reasonably expect
combatant status categories to do; and how best to design the protective regimes
in view of these potential functions. My claim is that the traditional notion of
POW status should carry no protective implications. In other words, I suggest that
unlawful combatants should be protected to the same extent as POWs (lawful
combatants). Developments in humanitarian law, military (and law enforcement)
policy, and the nature of organized hostilities favor “protective parity” across all
categories of war detainees.

II. THE DECLINE OF STATUS: TOWARD PROTECTIVE PARITY

In this Part, I outline the aforementioned developments in Geneva law. My
aim is to provide a brief overview of the concrete protective consequences that
attach to combatant status determinations. Toward this end, I survey the rights of
POWs and the rights of unlawful combatants—individuals who participate in the
hostilities without satisfying the minimum legal requirements to do so. This
survey supports two important propositions that will serve as the backdrop for my
broader policy claim. First, Geneva law accord substantial legal protection to both
lawful combatants (POWs) and unlawful combatants. Second, there are
10

Nevertheless, it is important to point out that Geneva law has moved in the direction of
“protective parity.” I document in great detail the various developments in other work. See Derek
Jinks, The Declining Significance of POW Status, 45 HARV. INT’L L. J. (forthcoming 2004).
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nevertheless important discrepancies in the protective schemes applicable to these
status categories.
A. Protections Applicable to POWs
Prisoners of war (POWs) enjoy substantial international legal protection pursuant
to the Geneva Convention on POWs (GPW or POW Convention).11 These
protections include: (1) the right to humane treatment (including important
limitations on coercive interrogation tactics);12 (2) due process rights;13 (3) the
right to release and repatriation upon the cessation of active hostilities;14 and (4)
the right to communication with (and the institutionalized supervision of)
protective agencies.15 The GPW also prohibits reprisals against POWs;16 and
precludes the use of POWs as slave labor.17 In addition, POWs may not be
prosecuted for their participation in the hostilitiesthat is, they are entitled to
“combatant immunity.”18 Moreover, the GPW makes clear that POW rights are
inalienable19 and non-derogable.20 Finally, the Convention requires that states
suppress the mistreatment of POWs by investigating, prosecuting, and punishing

11

Geneva Convention III, supra note ____.
Id. art. 13 (humane treatment); see also id. arts. 17-19 (rules concerning interrogation);
id. arts. 21-48 (rules governing conditions of confinement).
13
Id. arts. 99-108.
14
Id. art. 117-118.
15
Id. arts. 8-11.
16
Id. art. 13.
17
Id. arts. 49-57 .
18
This privilege is, as a formal matter, extra-conventional in that the Geneva
Conventions do not expressly accord any such privilege. It is nevertheless universally recognized.
See, e.g., Waldemar A. Solf & Edward R. Cummings, A Survey of Penal Sanctions Under
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, 9 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 205, 212
(1977) (“[T]hose who are entitled to the juridical status of ‘privileged combatant’ are immune
from criminal prosecution for those warlike acts which do not violate the laws and customs of war
but which might otherwise be common crimes under municipal law.”)); Georg Schwarzenberger,
Human Rights and Guerrilla Warfare, 1 IS. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 246, 246 (1971); Geoffrey S. Korn &
Michael L. Schmidt, “To Be Or Not To Be, That Is The Question” Contemporary Military
Operations and The Status of Captured Personnel, 1999 ARMY LAW. 1, 14 (1999) (arguing that
combatants, as privileged belligerents, are entitled to “a blanket of immunity for their pre-capture
warlike acts”); United States v. List, 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, 757, 1228, 8 War Crimes Reports
58 (1948). Moreover, the privilege may be inferred from several provisions of the GPW. See
Geneva Convention III, supra note ___, arts. 82, 87-89.
19
Geneva Convention III, supra note ___, art. 7.
20
Id. art. 5 (providing that the Convention “shall apply to the persons referred to in
Article 4 from the time they fall into the power of the enemy and until their final release and
repatriation.”).
12
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individuals responsible for violations of the Convention.21 Aggravated
mistreatment of persons entitled to POW status constitutes a “grave breach” of
international humanitarian law22—giving rise to individual criminal liability.23
The criminalization of POW rules is now also recognized in many national penal
codes24 and several important international agreements concerning the scope of
international criminal law—including the International Criminal Court25 and the
ad hoc U.N. criminal tribunal in the Former Yugoslavia.26
B. Protections Applicable to Unlawful Combatants
I next outline the protective schemes governing the treatment of unlawful
combatants in Geneva lawthat is, individuals who participate in hostilities
without satisfying the requirements for POW status. Traditionally, international
law did not protect unlawful combatants but, as I describe below, all captured
combatants enjoy substantial protection (even if some important discrepancies
persist). Whether this convergence in protective schemes is normatively attractive
is addressed in Part III.
1. Geneva Civilians Convention (the Fourth Geneva Convention)
The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons (GC or
Civilians Convention) provides detailed rules governing the treatment of
“civilians” in armed conflicts; and the substance of these rules mirrors in most
important respects the rights of POWs. These protections include: due process
21

Id. arts. 129-131.
See Geneva Convention III, supra note ___, arts. 129-131.
23
Id.; see also JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2nd ed. 2000)
(describing the emergence of individual criminal responsibility in the laws of war).
24
See, e.g., Int’l Comm. Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law, National
Implementation Database, available at <http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf/WebLAW2?OpenView>
(providing excerpts of implementing national legislation from over 50 countries); Coalition for the
Int’l Criminal Court, National Legislation Database, available at <http://www.cicc.org> (providing
full text of national war crimes legislation from over 35 states).
25
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 52d
Sess., Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, art. 8 (1998), reprinted in THE STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1998)
[hereinafter ICC Statute].
26
See U.N. S.C. Res. 808, annexed to Aspects of Establishing an International Tribunal
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, Report by the SecretaryGeneral, 48th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/25704, art. 2 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159
[hereinafter ICTY Statute].
22
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rights (including the right to fair trial in the event of criminal prosecution);27 the
right to humane treatment;28 freedom from coercive interrogation;29 freedom from
discrimination;30 the right to repatriation (including the right to leave enemy
territory voluntarily);31 the right to internal camp governance;32 and the
prohibition on attacks directed against civilian objects (including strict prohibition
of attacks on hospitals and other facilities providing essential services to the
civilian population).33
The Civilians Convention applies to all enemy nationalsincluding
“unlawful” combatantsnot protected by the other Conventions.34 Although this
point is often overlooked in current debates,35 it enjoys broad support in the legal
literature,36 contemporary international war crimes jurisprudence,37 and national
military manuals.38 Moreover, the text of the Civilians Convention suggests that it
27

See Geneva Convention IV, supra note ___, art. 64-76, 126, 146-47.
Id. arts. 27-34.
29
Id. arts. 31-32.
30
Id. arts. 1, 3, 27.
31
Id. arts. 35-38, 77, 132-135.
32
Id. arts. 101-104.
33
Id. arts. 13-26.
34
As I develop more fully below, Common Article 3, the provisions of Part II, and the
penal repression regime are applicable irrespective of the nationality of the person in question. See
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applies to unlawful combatants. Persons protected by the Convention are “those
who, at any given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves . . . in
the hands of a Party . . . of which they are not nationals.”39 The provision defining
“protected persons” also makes clear that several categories of persons are not
protected by the Convention. For example, nationals of a state “not bound by the
Convention are not protected by it.”40 In addition, nationals of “neutral” or “cobelligerent” states are not protected by the Convention “while the State of which
they are nationals has normal diplomatic representation in the State in whose
hands they are.”41 And, as previously discussed, the Civilians Convention does
not apply to persons protected by any of the other Conventions.42 The provision
does not, however, expressly limit the application of the Convention to persons
taking no part in the hostilities.43 Indeed, the Convention prescribes, in some
detail, rules governing the treatment of civilians “suspected of or engaged in
activities hostile to the State.”44 It is also important to note that the definitions of
“protected persons” in the other Geneva Conventions are, without exception, quite
detailed.45 When read in light of the other Conventions, the Civilians Convention
should not be interpreted as implicitly excluding from its protection a broad
category of individuals otherwise satisfying its definition of “protected persons.”
Application of the Civilians Convention to unlawful combatants, however,
is qualified by Article 5—the so-called “derogation” provision. The provision
authorizes states, subject to important limitations, to deny protections to
individuals “suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the
State [or the Occupying Power].”46 In full, it provides that:
Where in the territory of a Party to the conflict, the latter is
satisfied that an individual protected person is definitely suspected
of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the State, such
individual person shall not be entitled to claim such rights and
privileges under the present Convention as would, if exercised in
categories listed in Article 4 [GC III], he is not entitled to be treated as a prisoner of war. He is,
however, a “protected person” within the meaning of Article 4 [GC IV].”); BRITISH MILITARY
MANUAL, PART III: LAW OF LAND WARFARE 96 (1958) (United Kingdom).
39
Geneva Convention IV, supra note ___, art. 4.
40
Id.
41
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. art. 5.
45
See Geneva Convention I, supra note ___, art. 4; Geneva Convention II, supra note
___, art. 4; Geneva Convention III, supra note ___, art. 4
46
Geneva Convention IV, supra note ___, art. 5.
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the favour of such individual person, be prejudicial to the security
of such State.
Where in occupied territory an individual protected person is
detained as a spy or saboteur, or as a person under definite
suspicion of activity hostile to the security of the Occupying
Power, such person shall, in those cases where absolute military
security so requires, be regarded as having forfeited rights of
communication under the present Convention.
In each case, such persons shall nevertheless be treated with
humanity and, in case of trial, shall not be deprived of the rights of
fair and regular trial prescribed by the present Convention. They
shall also be granted the full rights and privileges of a protected
person under the present Convention at the earliest date consistent
with the security of the State or Occupying Power, as the case may
be.47
To summarize, the Civilians Convention protects unlawful combatants;
and these protections (when applicable in full) closely resemble the rights
accorded under the POW Convention. Of course, these protections are subject to
derogation if necessary for state security. Three important discrepancies between
POW and Civilian protections must be registered.
First, the rights of civilians taking part in hostilities—unlawful combatants—
are subject to derogation in some circumstances: POW rights are not. Second,
POWs are assimilated, for protective purposes, into the armed forces of the
detaining state. As such, they are entitled to trial before the same courts, and
according to the same procedure as members of the regular armed forces of the
detaining state. Civilians enjoy no such protection. Third, POWs are entitled to
combatant immunity—that is, they may not be punished for their very
participation in the hostilities. Civilians who take up arms may be subject to
criminal prosecution simply for having done so.
C. Supplementary Protections
Several other aspects of Geneva law confer some protection on unlawful
combatants. These protective schemes are far less detailed than the Civilians
Convention, nevertheless, because these regimes are broadly applicable, they
illustrate the degree of convergence across status categories.
47

Id.
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1. Penal Repression Regime of the Geneva Conventions
The Geneva Conventions also protect all unlawful combatants facing trial for
war crimes. Indeed, the Conventions prescribe a detailed inventory of procedural
rights guarantees for prosecutions brought under its substantive provisions. That
is, the Conventions provide for minimum procedural rights for any person
charged with serious violations of its substantive rules irrespective of the person’s
status under the Conventions.48 Any person prosecuted for violations of the
Geneva Conventions, irrespective of their status as “protected persons,” must be
provided with “safeguards of proper trial and defence, which shall not be less
favorable than” those outlined in Articles 105 and following of the Third Geneva
Convention (concerning POWs).49 Article 105 specifically provides for basic fair
trial rights including: the right to counsel of the defendant’s choice, the right to
confer privately with counsel, the right to call witnesses, and the right to an
interpreter.50 These provisions also require, for example, that accused persons be
granted the same right of appeal as that open to members of the armed forces of
the Detaining Power.51
2. Common Article 3
The Geneva Conventions also specify fundamental humanitarian
protections applicable to all persons subject to the authority of a party to the
conflict. That is, the Conventions detail minimum protections to be accorded all
persons no longer taking part in hostilities irrespective of: (1) the territory in
which the affected person is located; (2) the nationality of the affected person; or
(3) the character of the armed conflict. These principles, first codified in Common
Article 3 of the Conventions, govern the treatment of persons no longer taking
active part in the hostilities.52 All such persons are entitled to humane treatment
and, in the case of criminal charges, fair trial by “a regularly constituted court,
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples.”53 It is also important to note that this provision is, by its
48

See, e.g., Geneva Conventions IV, supra note ___, art. 146.
Geneva Convention I, supra note ___, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note ___,
art. 50; Geneva Convention III, supra note ___, art. 129; Geneva Convention IV, supra note ___,
art. 146.
50
Geneva Convention III, supra note ___, art. 105.
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Id. art. 106.
52
It is important to note that the provision expressly covers persons who take up arms
against the state and applies even to persons who do not lay down their arms voluntarily. See
Geneva Conventions, supra note ___, art. 3.
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Geneva Conventions, supra note ___, art. 3.
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nature, applicable to “unlawful combatants” in that it governs the relations
between states and informal armed opposition groups. The provision obligates
states to apply, at a minimum, the following principles in armed conflicts “not of
an international character”:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including
members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those
placed “hors de combat” by sickness, wounds, detention, or any
other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely,
without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or
faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end,
the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and
in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned
persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted
court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.54
Of course, Common Article 3, by its terms, applies only to armed conflicts
“not of an international character.”55 The structure and history of the Conventions,
however, make clear that the provision applies in all armed conflicts. Utilizing
language originally proposed as text for the preamble to the four Conventions, the
drafters the provision sought to invoke the core principles of the treaty--those
principles that should apply even in the absence of an international armed
conflict; those principles that would pierce the veil of sovereignty. Indeed, the
character of Common Article 3 was well understood by the drafters of the
Conventions as evidenced by the ICRC Commentary:
This minimum requirement in the case of a non-international
armed conflict, is a fortiori applicable in international conflicts. It
proclaims the guiding principle common to all four Geneva
54
55

Geneva Conventions, supra note ___, art. 3.
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Conventions, and from it each of them derives the essential
provision around which it is built.”56
The purpose of Common Article 3 was, therefore, to “ensur(e) respect for the
few essential rules of humanity which all civilised nations consider as valid
everywhere and under all circumstances and as being above and outside war
itself.”57 In short, “[i]t is both legally and morally untenable that the rules
contained in common Article 3, which constitute mandatory minimum rules
applicable to internal conflicts, in which rules are less developed than in respect
of international conflicts, would not be applicable to conflicts of an international
character.”58 Indeed, the applicability of Common Article 3 to international armed
conflicts is now recognized in the jurisprudence of the International Court of
Justice (ICJ),59 the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY),60 the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),61 and the InterAmerican Commission for Human Rights.62 It is U.S. military policy to apply
Common Article 3 in all armed conflicts (and even in situations not rising to the
level of an “armed conflict” such as internal disturbances).63 The Judge Advocate
General of the U.S. Army endorses this view as well.64 Moreover, Additional
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, now ratified by over 160 countries,
clarifies that the protections codified in Common Article 3 apply, as a matter of
positive international law, to all armed conflicts.65 This avalanche of legal
authority prompted the ICTY Appeals Chamber to proclaim that: “It is [now]
indisputable that common Article 3, which sets forth a minimum core of
56

ICRC COMMENTARY IV, supra note ____, AT 14.
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58
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mandatory rules, reflects the fundamental humanitarian principles which underlie
international humanitarian law as a whole, and upon which the Geneva
Conventions in their entirety are based.”66
3. Article 75 of Additional Protocol I

Building on the protective schemes identified above, Article 75 of AP I
and Article 6 of AP II clearly establish minimum humanitarian protections
applicable to all persons “in the power of” a belligerent state—irrespective of
whether any such person participated in the hostilities. Widely understood as the
“gap filler” in Geneva law,67 the “fundamental guarantees” provisions of the 1977
Protocols make clear that all persons subject to the authority of a belligerent are
entitled to humanitarian protection. As discussed previously, the drafting history
of Article 75 suggests that the provision was designed: (1) to clarify the scope and
application of several fundamental guarantees recognized in the 1949
Conventions; (2) to extend greater protections to persons not covered by those
Conventions—most notably, nationals of the detaining power, nationals of cobelligerents and neutrals, and stateless persons and refugees; and, by implication,
(3) to condition the derogation powers conferred on states by Article 5 of the
Civilians Convention by rendering a broader range of rights expressly nonderogable.68
Two points regarding the scope and content of Article 75 are relevant for
present purposes. First, the text, structure, and drafting history of AP I make plain
that it covers unlawful combatants. Second, Article 75 provides substantial
protection—particularly to persons detained, arrested, or interned and persons
facing criminal charges. As mentioned previously and discussed more fully
below, the substance of this provision is clearly modeled on and, as a
consequence, closely resembles that of Common Article 3. The most important
advances relate to criminal procedure rights. In this regard, the provision reads:
No sentence may be passed and no penalty may be executed on a
person found guilty of a penal offense related to the armed conflict
except pursuant to a conviction pronounced by an impartial and

66

ICTY, Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic (Celebici Camp case), Appeals Chamber, 2001, at
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regularly constituted court respecting the generally principles of
regular judicial procedures . . . . 69
Unlike Common Article 3, Article 75 of AP I specifies many of these principles.
They include: (1) provision of “all necessary rights and means of defence” (which
almost certainly includes the right to counsel, the right to be present at the
hearing, the right to compel process, the right to be informed of pending charges,
the right to be accorded sufficient time and resources to formulate a defense, and
the right to challenge alleged unfairness in the proceedings on appeal); (2) the
right to be presumed innocent; (3) freedom from compelled self-incrimination; (4)
the right to be advised of rights and available post-conviction remedies; (5)
freedom from ex post facto application of the criminal law; and (6) recognition of
the principle of non bis in idem.70
D. Persistent Gaps and Deficiencies in Geneva Law
Geneva law provides substantial legal protection to all war detainees
including unlawful combatants. All persons detained by the enemy are entitled to
the minimum protections of Common Article 3 and Article 75 of AP I. And, in
virtue of Articles 4 and 5 of the Civilians Convention, all enemy aliens are
“protected persons” under the Conventions; and are entitled, at a minimum, to
humane treatment and fair trial rights. This provision also makes clear that
“unlawful combatants” are presumptively covered by the full protections of the
Civilians Conventions—even if some of these protections can be suspended if
(and so long as) necessary to protect state security. Moreover, all persons accused
of “war crimes” are entitled to due process rights that mirror in most important
respects the rights accorded POWs.
Does the denial of POW status carry any significant humanitarian
consequences? Although the analysis to this point strongly suggests there are no
such consequences, each alternative protective scheme is arguably deficient in
important respects. Of course, the Civilians Convention writ large accords
protection that in most important respects mirrors that of the POW Convention.
And although the Civilians Convention protects unlawful combatants, its field of
application is limited to enemy nationals (who must also be nationals of a state
party to the Convention). In addition, the derogation regime of Article 5
empowers states to deny some unlawful combatants certain rights recognized in
the Convention if necessary to protect national security.
69
70
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The other alternative protective schemes also exhibit potentially
significant deficiencies. Common Article 3 protects all combatants no longer
taking active part in hostilities, but the substantive rules of the provision are cast
in abstract terms the precise contours of which are unclear. In addition, the
provision does not expressly include a right to release and repatriation at the close
of hostilities. Moreover, no express provision is made in the Conventions for the
enforcement of Common Article 3.71 Recall that the persons protected by
Common Article 3 are not, as a formal matter, “protected persons” within the
meaning of the Conventions.72 As a consequence, violations of Common Article 3
do not constitute “grave breaches” of the Conventions; and, at the time the
Conventions were drafted, it was unclear whether violations of Common Article 3
gave rise to individual criminal liability at all.73 Article 75 of AP I gives rise to
similar concerns. Although it protects all persons “in the power of” a belligerent
state (and its substantive requirements are much more specific than Common
Article 3), AP I does not prescribe an enforcement mechanism for this provision.
That is, violations of Article 75, like those of Common Article 3, are not “grave
breaches” of the Conventions; and it is unclear whether they give rise to
individual criminal liability.74 Moreover, the legal status of AP I in many conflicts
is itself somewhat ambiguous. The problem is that many states of geo-strategic
significance have not ratified AP I including France, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel,
Pakistan, and the United States.75 As a consequence, its legal status for these
states is unclear. Finally, the penal repression regime of the Conventions protects
all persons subject to prosecution for violations of the laws of war but these
protections include only fair trial rightsfailing to establish any protection
outside this context.
In short, although Geneva law accords unlawful combatants substantial
protection, some gaps in the coverage of these protective schemes persist. The
current regime approximates, but falls short of, protective parity. In Part III, I
assess the propriety of this regime (and its trajectory) through a sustained policy
defense of protective parity.
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III. THE CASE FOR PROTECTIVE PARITY

The unique protective significance of POW status (and the claims that justify
this extra increment of protection) suggests that POWs are systematically overprotected (even if only to a modest extent) and unlawful combatants are
systematically under-protected. I conclude that the best regime would subject all
captured combatants to a uniform protective scheme. In this Part, I offer a
conceptual and normative defense of “protective parity”—suggesting that, under
current law, POWs are systematically over-protected and unlawful combatants are
systematically under-protected. In making the case for protective parity, I evaluate
the strengths (and potential weaknesses) of this approach. I also analyze whether
protective parity can be reconciled with a strong commitment to the principle of
distinction.
In Section A, I argue that the reasons for treating POWs fairly and
humanely are equally applicable to unlawful combatants. That is, the policy
claims favoring humane treatment are not tethered to the organizational
characteristics that define POW status. In Section B, I argue that the securitybased rationales for denying protections to unlawful combatants are equally
applicable to POWs. Once again, policy claims are not linked to general
organizational features of the fighting force in question.
Finally, in Section C, I reject the claim that some treatment differential is
appropriate to enforce the principle of distinction. Even if “irregularization”
undermines distinction, the question is how best to encourage fighters to
distinguish themselves from the civilian population. I maintain that protective
status categories are an inefficient way to incentivize combatants because these
categories necessarily trade on collective considerations—such as the
organizational characteristics of the fighting force. The rule of distinction would
be better served, I submit, by an individualized “war crimes” approach that:
accords all fighters substantial humanitarian protection; and punishes bad actors
for failing to take adequate precautions under the circumstances.

A. Why Protect POWs?
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As described in Part II, POWs enjoy substantial protection in Geneva law.
Two kinds of claims justify this protection: (1) humanitarian; and (2) strategic.
First, the core principles of humanitarian law provide one important rationale. All
captured fighters are “victims of war” and, as human beings, are entitled to
humane treatment.76 Geneva law purports to protect only those combatants who
have been rendered hors de combat—that is, combatants who, for whatever
reason, are no longer taking part in the hostilities. In other words, the “status” of
captured fighters lies somewhere between “combatants” proper and “noncombatants.” They are detainees at the mercy of the detaining authority. In the
absence of some compelling reason to deny protection, Geneva rules should
accord humanitarian protection to such persons.77 The point here is that this kind
of rationale proves too much—suggesting that all captured combatants should be
accorded, as a presumptive matter, humane treatment. The foundation of this type
of rationale is, in the end, the notion that certain entitlements issue from the very
“human-ness” of the individual. Clearly, this type of claim does not track the
definitional attributes of POW status—this type of claim would justify treating
unlawful combatants humanely as well.
Second, there are compelling strategic reasons to treat the enemy well.
The general consensus is that observance of these rules is, in most circumstances,
in the interest of opposing forces. Indeed, there is a substantial, interdisciplinary
literature documenting the strategic benefits of treating enemy POWs well.78
Harsh treatment of the enemy over-deters surrender—encouraging enemy forces
to fight to the death.79 Some evidence also suggests that poor treatment of the
76
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enemy undermines the morale of the capturing state’s forces.80 Other studies
suggest that humane treatment of the enemy improves the ability of states to raise
professional armies.81 And, so long as it is consistent with the efficient pursuit of
military objectives, humane treatment minimizes various audience costs
associated with waging modern wars: it is easier to build and sustain support for
the war effort at home; and it is easier to build and sustain international
operational (war-fighting) coalitions. In fact, Dan Reiter and Alan Stam utilize an
extensive regression model (relying on an important, relatively-new data set) to
make the case that humane treatment of POWs is correlated with battlefield
effectiveness.82 These claims, considered in isolation, are unspectacular—indeed,
the strategic benefits of treating POWs well have long been understood. The
important point for our purposes is that these studies—whether they involve
social psychological models of soldiers, interview data from combatants,
comparative surrender and defection rates, or polling data—do not track the
behavioral and organizational prerequisites of POW status. That is, these studies
(and the claims that derive from them) document the importance of treating
members of the opposing armed forces well—without regard to whether such
persons satisfy the requirements for POW status. This cluster of claims also
proves too much—the reasons for treating POWs well apply, in general, to
unlawful combatants.
B. Why deny Unlawful Combatants (Certain) Protections?
Nevertheless, there may be good reasons to deny unlawful combatants
some (or all) the protections accorded POWs. In Parts II and III, I demonstrated
(1) that Geneva law protects unlawful combatants—persons taking direct part in
hostilities without satisfying the requirements for POW status; and (2) that these
protections approximate those accorded POWs. This Section in essence assesses
the following hypothesis: the current regime—substantial protection with some
important differentials—strikes the proper balance between humanitarianism and
military necessity.
Consider again the case of the detainees in Cuba. Recall that the official
U.S. government position is that neither Taliban nor al Qaeda fighters qualify as
POWs because they failed to satisfy international standards defining lawful
combatants.83 In short, the United States maintains that assignment of POW status
80
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in this case would be incorrect as a matter of law and imprudent as a matter of
policy. A brief summary of the policy arguments is useful for present purposes.
Specifically, the U.S. argues that neither group of captured fighters satisfies the
express requirements of the Geneva Convention for the Protection of Prisoners of
War (GPW); and that POW protections would impede the investigation and
prosecution of suspected terrorists. Of particular concern on the policy front are
(1) restrictions on the interrogation of POWs;84 (2) the criminal procedure rights
of POWs (which might preclude trial by special “military commission”);85 (3) the
right of POWs to release and repatriation following the cessation of hostilities;86
and (4) possible claims of “combatant immunity” that might shield individuals
from prosecution for acts of terrorism. The U.S. position is that these rights are
inconsistent with various security imperatives. On the strength of these claims
(and the merits of its classification determination), the U.S. concluded that the

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-13.html [hereinafter U.S. Policy on
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CERTAIN NON-CITIZENS IN THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM §1(a), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16,
2001) [hereinafter MILITARY ORDER]. It is a fair reading of the GPW that POWs facing criminal
charges are entitled to trial by court-martial or regular civil court. See Geneva Convention III,
supra note ___, arts. 99, 102; Neal Kumar Katyal & Laurence Tribe, Waging War, Deciding
Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1263-66 (2002) (concluding, in view of
rights recognized in the GPW, that the Military Order must cover only unlawful belligerents);
Laura Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military Commissions,
International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407, 1423-24 2002); Daryl A.
Mundis, The Use of Military Commissions to Prosecute Individuals Accused of Terrorist Acts, 96
AM. J. INT’L L. 320, 324-26 (2002); Diane F. Orenlichter & Robert Kogod Goldman, When
Justice Goes to War: Prosecuting Terrorists Before Military Commissions, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 653, 659-63 (2002); Jordan Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality,
23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (2001) [hereinafter Paust, Courting Illegality]. Under this view, denying
POW status would appear to leave open the possibility of trying detainees before military
commissions for violations of the law of war. See supra note ___.
86
See Geneva Convention III, supra note ___, arts. 117-118 (recognizing the right to
repatriation); Joan Fitzpatrick, Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on
Terrorism, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 345, 353 (2002) (suggesting that this right is one procedural
consequence of denying POW status); Rabkin, supra note ___ (defending denial of POW status to
Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees, in part, on this ground); Wedgwood, supra note ___ (same).
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detainees are “unlawful combatants” (or “unprivileged belligerents”) not
protected by the Geneva Conventions.87
I want to make two points general points; then say a bit more about a
couple of these issues. First, some of these rights are not unique to POW status.
Specifically, the Civilians Convention recognizes interrogation rights and the
right to release and repatriation are accorded several categories of detainees—
indeed, the language of the two treaties is identical. Moreover, several
commentators and some military manuals infer these rights from Common Article
3 and Article 75 of AP I. Second, these security-based claims, if correct, prove too
much. These security-based claims would apply irrespective of whether the
detainees were properly classified as POWs or not. That is, if these protective
schemes compromise legitimate security interests, then POWs are systematically
over-protected.
To analyze whether the prevailing scheme over-protects unlawful
combatants, it is important to examine more closely the unique protective
consequences of POW status. Two potentially important protections highlighted
by the U.S. position merit more extended consideration. First, the POW
Convention prohibits trial of POWs by special military courts (such as military
commissions).88 The Convention provides that POWs “can be validly sentenced
only if the sentence has been pronounced by the same courts according to the
same procedure as in the case of members of the armed forces of the Detaining
Power . . . .”89 There is no analogue in the Civilians Convention. Second, POWs
enjoy a broad “combatant immunity” that precludes punishing them for their very
participation in the hostilities.90 Civilians enjoy no such immunity. Although these
claims also prove too much (in that the logic that undergirds them would also
apply to POWs), I have a bit more to say about each.

1. Assimilation Rights and Ad Hoc “Military Commissions”
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In addition, the U.S. government asserts that the Geneva Conventions do not, in any
case, apply to al Qaeda fightersbecause that group is a non-governmental, criminal organization
not party to the treaties. See U.S. Policy on Guantanamo Detainees, supra note ___, at 1 (“AlQaida is not a state party to the Geneva Convention; it is a foreign terrorist group. As such, its
members are not entitled to POW status.”).
88
See, e.g., Paust, Courting Illegality, supra note ___; Katyal & Tribe, supra note ___;
Drumbl, supra note ___.
89
Geneva Convention III, supra note ___, art. 102.
90
See supra text accompanying notes ___ (explaining concept and collecting citations).
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One potentially important consequence of POW status is that it precludes
the use of specialized, ad hoc criminal proceedings (such as the contemplated
military commissions). This point enjoys a surface plausibility in that the POW
Convention requires that POWs be tried by the same courts in which the armed
forces of the detaining power would be tried.91 POWs held by the United States,
for example, must be tried in U.S. courts-martial. This rule, for which there is no
direct analogue in the Civilians Convention, seemingly suggests that military
commissions are a viable prosecutorial option only if the detainees are not POWs.
This claim, however, requires some qualification. As described in detail in
Part III, unlawful combatants enjoy general criminal procedure rights that mirror
the protections accorded POWs. If the policy value of military commissions
derives from their summary procedures, then the protections afforded unlawful
combatants would deprive the commissions of their value in any case. That is, the
rights of unlawful combatants would require procedural guarantees identical to
those of courts-martial. In addition, the Geneva Conventions arguably prohibit
irregular “military commissions” irrespective of the procedural rights guaranteed
in such proceedings. Recall that all persons facing criminal punishment are
entitled to trial by “regular” courts.92 The Moreover, it is important to point out
that this POW “right” to trial by regular military court is, in many instances, a
disability. That is, trial procedures utilized by military courts often fall short of
international due process standards.93 When evaluated along this axis, the military
commission procedures arguably fail to satisfy in several respects the minimum
requirements of Geneva law. For example, the commissions themselves arguably
do not constitute impartial, independent tribunals.94 The commissions arguably do
not qualify as “tribunals established by law,” and they clearly are not “regularly
constituted courts.”95 In addition, the Department of Defense procedures arguably
91

See Geneva Convention III, supra note ___, art. 82.
See Geneva Conventions, supra note ___, common art. 3; AP I, supra note ___, art. 75.
93
See, e.g., U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights,
Issue of the Administration of Justice through Military Tribunals, 9 July 2002, Doc. No.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/4 (Report of Louis Jonet) (summarizing poor human rights record of military
courts).
94
See, e.g., LAWYER’S COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, TRIALS UNDER MILITARY ORDER:
A GUIDE TO THE FINAL RULES FOR THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS 5 (2003) [hereinafter LCHR,
TRIALS UNDER MILITARY ORDER] (arguing that the military commission scheme is “particularly
susceptible to abuse because the entire process is limited to one branch of government (the
executive) with no meaningful independent oversight or review by either the judiciary or the
legislature, and none of the participants has both standing and an interest to challenge possible
abuses.”).
95
See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: The Ad Hoc DOD Rules
of Procedure, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 677, 687-90 (2002) [hereinafter Paust, Ad Hoc DoD Rules].
92
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deprive defendants of any meaningful right to counsel.96 They also limit the
defendant’s ability to mount an effective defense by sharply qualifying the right to
confront witnesses and compel process.97 Finally, the procedures do not recognize
a right to appeal to a higher tribunal.98
2. Combatant Immunity
Another potentially significant protective consequence of POW status is
combatant immunity. Indeed, comparison of the schemes analyzed in Parts II and
III makes clear that the real purchase of POW status is combatant immunity and
not the procedural rights protections attaching to the designation. That is, the most
significant consequence of POW status is that lawful combatants cannot be
punished for their otherwise lawful participation in the hostilities. This point of
law, although firmly-established, requires some qualification.
Although POWs are entitled to engage in combat, they must comply with
the laws of war.99 Accordingly, a POW may be prosecuted for pre-capture
96

One problematic aspect of the rules is that civilian counsel (the counsel chosen by the
accused) can be excluded from “closed Commission proceedings” and denied “access to any
information protected under [the procedure’s security exclusion].” Dep’t of Defense, Military
Comm’n Order No. 1 (Mar. 21, 2002) §§ 4(C)(3), 6(B)(3), 6(D)(5) [hereinafter DOD Order],
available at http:// www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf; see also Paust, Ad
Hoc DoD Rules, supra note __, at 690.
97
The procedures drastically curtail the right of confrontation. Cross-examination of
witnesses against the accused is authorized only with respect to witnesses “who appear before the
Commission.” DoD Order, supra note 21, § 5(I). Witnesses can also provide testimony “by
telephone, audiovisual means, or other means,” by “introduction of prepared declassified
summaries of evidence,” “testimony from prior trials and proceedings,” “sworn [and even]
unsworn written statements,” and “reports.” Id. § 6(D). See also Paust, Ad Hoc DoD Rules, supra
note __, at 685-87.
98
Verdicts issued by the military commissions may be appealed to specially established
“Review Panels.” See DoD Order, supra note __, § 6(H)(4); see also LCHR, TRIALS UNDER
MILITARY ORDER, supra note __, at 5-6 (criticizing the absence of a right to appeal guilty verdicts
to a civilian court).
99
See, e.g., MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 712 (1961) (“[A]cts committed in war by enemy civilians and members of
armed forces may be punished as crimes under a belligerent’s municipal law only to the extent that
such acts are violative of the international law on the conduct of hostilities. Clearly the rule of
warfare should be pointless...if every single act of war may by unilateral municipal fiat be made a
common crime and every prisoner of war executed as a murderer. International law delineates the
outer limits of the liability of supposed war criminals; and conformity with that law affords a
complete defense for the violent acts charged.”); U.S. DEP’T NAVY, ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO
THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NWP 9 (Rev. A), FM 1-10, at 5-9 & n.9,
11-14 & n.43 (1989) (“The Convention’s [GPW] underlying philosophy is that POWs should not
be punished merely for having engaged in armed conflict....” “Prisoners of war may not be

26

Laws of War

offenses only if his actions (1) rise to the level of a “war crime”100 or “crime
against humanity;”101 or (2) are unrelated to the state of hostilities (i.e., are
common crimes).102 Properly understood, the scope of combatant immunity
therefore underscores its relative insignificance on the policy front. Consider that
acts of terrorism in the context of an armed conflict are always war crimes103—as
are all attacks directed against the civilian population as such.104 In addition,
violations of the rule of distinction are also war crimes105—as are acts of
perfidy.106 The upshot is that there are no protective consequences associated with
POW status for persons who have engaged in terrorism, attacked civilians, or
committed warlike acts without adequately distinguishing themselves from
punished for hostile acts directed against opposing forces prior to capture, unless those acts
constituted violations of the law of armed conflict.”).
100
Even if convicted for pre-capture offenses, enemy combatants retain the benefits of
the POW regime of GPW according to Article 85 of that treaty: “Prisoners of war prosecuted
under the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture shall retain, even if
convicted, the benefits of the present Convention.” Geneva Convention III, supra note ___, art.
85.
101
See ICRC COMMENTARY III, supra note ___ (Commentary to Article 82 identifies
“crimes against humanity” as a crime that pierces combatant immunity).
102
See generally ICRC COMMENTARY III, supra, at 413-423 (setting forth rule). See,
e.g., United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp 1506, 1526 (S.D. Fla. 1990), aff’d, 117 F.3d 1206 (11th
Cir. 1997), cert. denied 523 U.S. 1060 (1998) (prosecuting prisoner of war for drug trafficking).
Therefore, the immunity does not shield from prosecution enemy combatants charged with precapture terrorist offenses not related to the conflict.
103
See, e.g., Hans-Peter Gasser, Acts of Terror, “Terrorism,” and International
Humanitarian Law, 84 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 547 (2002) (cataloguing various war crimes
provisions implicated by acts of terrorism). Consider that such acts typically violate several
provisions of Geneva law including: (1) the prohibition on attacks of civilians and civilian objects,
AP I, supra note ___, arts. 51, 52; (2) the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks, AP I, supra note
___, art. 51; (3) the murder of persons no longer taking active part in hostilities, Geneva
Conventions, supra note ___, common art. 3; AP I supra note ___, art. 75; and (4) the murder of
persons “protected” by the Conventions. See, e.g., Geneva Convention IV, supra note ___, art.
146 (“grave breach” provision of Civilians Convention). Moreover, acts of terrorism are now
expressly identified as “war crimes” in AP I and the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda. See AP I, supra note ___, art. 51 (2) (“Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose
of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.”); Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and
Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of
Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed
in the Territory of Neighbouring States, Between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, S.C.
Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., Annex, 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), art. 4 (d)
(criminalizing “acts of terrorism”).
104
See AP I, supra note ___, arts. 51 (2), 52 (1).
105
See, e.g., AP I, supra note ___, art. 45 (1) (requiring combatants to distinguish
themselves from civilian population).
106
See, e.g., AP I, supra note ___, arts. 37-39.
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civilians. Moreover, POWs, even if immune from criminal prosecution, may be
deprived of their liberty because of their participation in the hostilities.107 That is,
all enemy combatants, even if POWs, may be detained without criminal charge
for the duration of the hostilities.
In short, the policy and protective consequences of combatant immunity
are minimal. Combatant immunity, properly defined, confers protection on one
important category of fighters: unlawful combatants who have otherwise
complied with the law of war. These fighters—if denied POW status and
therefore denied combatant immunity—may be prosecuted upon capture for their
very participation in the hostilities. A compete defense of protective parity must
demonstrate that all combatants should enjoy this immunity. In the balance of this
Section, I take up this task.
There are sound policy reasons to accord all captured combatants
immunity for their otherwise lawful warlike acts. Combatant immunity—given its
contours as just described—could and should be used as a tool to promote
compliance with the rules of war. If all captured combatants failing to satisfy the
requirements for POW status are subject to prosecution for any warlike acts, then
these fighters have no incentive to comply with the law of war in the conduct of
hostilities. Although their very failure to satisfy POW status requirements
suggests some conduct contrary to the laws of war, this conduct, in many
instances, may not reflect any individual culpability. Recall that POW status turns
on collective considerations.108 In this sense, the rules are directed primarily to the
high command and other policymakers. For example, it is inopposite to
characterize as “criminal” (as a formal or sociological matter) the otherwise
lawful warlike acts of: (1) civilians who take up arms to defend their country
against an enemy to whom they owe no allegiance;109 (2) soldiers fighting for a
state that, as a matter of policy, does not issue uniforms satisfying the POW rules;
107

Geneva Convention III, supra note ___, art. 21-22.
See id. art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3320-22, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138-40.
109
In some circumstances, such civilians are indeed entitled to POW status—irrespective of
whether they are “regularized.” See GPW, supra note __, art. 4 (a)(6) (according POW status to all
“[i]nhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take
up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular
armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.”). The
scope of this provision, however, is unclear because the spontaneity and “insufficient time to
organize” elements are ambiguous. See ICRC COMMENTARY III, supra note ___, at 67- 68. The
more broadly the provision is read, the more closely Geneva law more approximates protective
parity. The important point is that these requirements only loosely track individual culpability. In
addition, the very fact that these so-called levées en masse are accorded POW status suggests that,
as a structural matter, Geneva law seeks to protect combatants who fight in a way that exhibits no
culpability—even if this protection may compromise the principle of distinction.
108
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or (3) soldiers fighting for a state that, as a general matter, has not complied with
the rules of war. In addition, “unlawful” belligerency, fighting without satisfying
the requirements for POW status, does not in all circumstances threaten the
civilian population—that is, not all acts of “unlawful” belligerency undermine the
principle of distinction. This is obviously true in some circumstances—think of an
irregular fighter (who is out of uniform perhaps) manning a tank, armored vehicle,
or fighter aircraft. In such circumstances, the fighter’s status as a combatant is
clear to the attacking forces of the enemy; and, as a consequence, the structural
capacity of these attacking forces to distinguish between civilians and combatants
is not compromised. Consider two more nuanced examples: (1) irregular fighters
positioned on the battlefied so as to make clear to the enemy their belligerent
status; and (2) irregular fighters embedded in regular armed forces clearly
deployed in an aggressive posture. These examples suggest that the criminal
character of belligerent acts will depend on the circumstances surrounding the
commission of any such acts. In other words, some conduct that results in the
denial of POW status suggests culpability; some does not.
Protective parity provides the best approach to the problem. Captured
combatants (irrespective of their status) should be subject to criminal prosecution
only if they have committed acts that constitute war crimes. Conversely, if
combatants do not engage in such acts, they should not be punished for their very
participation in the conduct of war. As I develop more fully below, this rule is
poses no grave danger to the principle of distinction if we define as war crimes all
acts of irregularization that, given the circumstances, threaten innocent
civilians.110 Critics of the view advanced here might defend the criminalization of
unlawful belligerency on the grounds that (1) the irregularization of warfare
resulting from such acts (irrespective of whether they exhibit a culpable mental
state) poses a grave and generalized threat to civilians; and (2) the criminal
sanction of is necessary to deter such persons from taking up arms.111 Although
plausible, this line of reasoning suffers from two structural defects. First,
criminalization of belligerency creates perverse incentives for the unlawful
combatants—because their very participation in the hostilities subjects them to
criminal prosecution upon capture, they have no incentive to comply with the law
of war. Protecting the victims of warfare, including civilians, might best be
110

This is, in general, the approach of Protocol I. See Protocol I, supra note __, art. 44 (3) (“In
order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the effects of hostilities,
combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they are
engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack.”).
111
See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 29 (2004). Here I analyze whether the provision of combatant
immunity to all fighters would subvert the “principle of distinction.” In the next Section, I address
the more general claim that the denial of humanitarian protection to unlawful combatants
incentivizes fighters to observe the “principle of distinction.” See infra Section III.C
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achieved by maximizing the incentives of combatants (those who are engaged in
the fight) to comply with the law of war. As discussed above, the criminalization
of belligerency eschews this type of incentive structure in favor of one that seeks
to discourage would-be fighters from taking up arms in the first place. Second,
criminalization of belligerency does not substantially alter the incentive structure
of civilians contemplating participation in hostilities. All would-be combatants
have non-trivial reasons to refrain from any direct participation in the hostilities.
Recall that “peaceful” civilians are immune from lawful attack; all combatants, on
the other hand, may be made the object of attack. In addition, “peaceful” civilians
may be detained only in a narrow range of circumstances; whereas all combatants,
upon capture, may be detained for the duration of the hostilities. In short, the
structure of Geneva law discourages civilian participation in armed conflict. This
is not to say that civilians participate in hostilities at a low rate. The point is that
would-be fighters take up arms only if they are willing to assume substantial risk
to life and liberty. The pool of civilians otherwise willing to fight includes only
those who value highly the benefits they expect to issue from participation in the
fight. For these individuals, the criminalization of belligerency adds only a
modest disincentive (if any) to join the fight.
C. Protective Parity and the Principle of Distinction

The Geneva Conventions protect unlawful combatants; and this protection
very closely approximates that accorded POWs. At first blush, this outcome might
seem normatively unattractive. After all, if POW status is irrelevant, then
combatants (and states) arguably have no incentive to comply with the
organizational requirements of the POW Convention. And, of course, such an
incentive structure would risk unraveling the fabric of international humanitarian
law by eroding the “rule of distinction.” In short, over-protection of unlawful
combatants risks systematic under-protection of “innocent” civilians as a whole.
Although there is much to recommend this line of argument, it is in the
end predicated on a mistaken assumption about the relationship between
protective status and conduct. That is, the humanitarian critique of protective
parity assumes that protection is a carrot (and denial of protection, a stick) to
induce law-abiding conduct in time of war. One could, perhaps, design a rational
humanitarian regime around the principle that its protections should cover only
those who comply with its substantive commands. That, however, is not an
organizing principle of Geneva law. To the contrary, the scope, content, and
trajectory of Geneva law clearly demonstrate that humanitarian protection is not
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used as an incentive to comply with the laws of war. Indeed, the protective
regimes of Geneva law expressly condition the authority of states to enforce its
substantive rules. Consider that the penal repression regime of the 1949
Conventions and Article 75 of AP I require states to accord all persons accused of
violating the Conventions certain due process rights.112 In addition, the POW
Convention makes clear that POWs do not lose their protective status even if
convicted of the most serious war crimes.113 Nevertheless, this may only prove
that Geneva law is incoherent and normatively suspect. In other words, these
points do not address the deeper issue of whether “protective parity” is consistent
with the principle of distinction.
Assume that the organizational and behavioral prerequisites for POW
status would, if observed, promote the rule of distinction—a questionable but
useful assumption. The only question then is how best to encourage fighters to
comply with these standards. An important point here is that, although Geneva
law provides substantial protection to unlawful combatants, it nevertheless
provides incentives for individuals to comply with its rules. As discussed more
fully in Parts I and II, persons violating the laws of war face the prospect of
criminal prosecution. Geneva law, in this sense, might be understood as exhibiting
a two pronged strategy: (1) it protects all persons subject to the authority of a
belligerent state (or armed opposition group) irrespective of their “status” (what I
have called “protective parity”); and (2) it subjects all persons violating its
substantive rules to criminal prosecution irrespective of their “status” (what I will
call the “war crimes approach” to enforcement).
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Compare these robust procedural rights with the minimal procedural protections
accorded in status determination proceedings. See, e.g., GPW III, supra note ___, art. 5 (requiring
only that “in the case of doubt”, status is determined by a “competent tribunal”). For a detailed
analysis of Article 5, see Yasmin Naqvi, Doubtful Prisoner-of-War Status, 84 INT’L REV. RED
CROSS 571 (2002).
113
Geneva Convention III, supra note ___, art. 85 (“Prisoners of war prosecuted under
the laws of the Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture shall retain, even if convicted,
the benefits of the present Convention.”). Although the provision references “the laws of the
Detaining Power”—which might be understood as distinct from the “laws of war,” the drafting
history, ICRC Commentary, and interpretation of leading military manuals make clear that it
encompasses prosecution for “international” crimes. It is also important to note that the Civilians
Convention does not have a direct analogue to Article 85. However, this provision was considered
necessary in the Third Convention because of the conduct elements embedded in the definition of
POWs. See id. art. 4 (A) (2). No such provision is required in the Civilians Convention because:
(1) its definition of “protected persons” does not include any conduct elements; and (2) the Article
5 derogation regime provides an exhaustive catalogue of protective consequences issuing from
conduct. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note ___, arts. 4, 5.
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Of course, critics of protective parity might suggest that these two
commitments are not so easily separated. These critics might point out that some
rules defining status categories (such as the definition of POWs) are themselves
also primary rules of conduct. After all, when an enemy combatant removes his
uniform (donning only civilian clothing) and conceals his weapons, he has
committed conduct that arguably both (1) deprives him upon capture of POW
status; and (2) transgresses the rule of distinction (and perhaps the prohibition on
perfidy)—hence, endangering innocent civilians. That is, the same conduct
determines whether the combatant is a POW and whether he has committed a war
crime. This contention, so framed, is both accurate and important—though not for
the reason our critics might suppose. It is correct to say that the same conduct
might have both status consequences and criminal consequences, but this only
underscores the conceptual integrity of protective parity. Consider again the case
of the hypothetical combatant fighting in civilian clothes with arms concealed.
There are, as just described, two consequences: denial of POW status and
prosecution for war crimes. Under the principle of protective parity, the first
consequence has no protective implications The second consequence, as a formal
matter, also has no protective implications. Throughout his confinement and any
criminal proceedings (irrespective of the outcome), the fighter will enjoy the full
protections of the Geneva law. On the other hand, our hypothetical fighter will
face negative consequences—criminal punishment for his acts. Negative
consequences issue from the fighter’s failure to comply with the laws of war, but
the imposition of these negative consequences is itself governed by the protective
schemes of Geneva law. The important point is that the scope and content of
protective schemes are conceptually distinct from the scope and content of
enforcement schemes. The former need not be inextricably connected to the later.
The upshot is that protective parity need not erode the rule of distinction—
protection can coincide with the energetic suppression of war crimes.
Moreover, there are good reasons to prefer from a deterrence perspective
the prevailing approach in Geneva law. Recall that there are at least two ways to
build into humanitarian regimes structural incentives to comply: (1) denial of
humanitarian protection to bad actors (coupled perhaps with criminal
prosecutions); or (2) criminal prosecution of bad actors (all of whom nevertheless
enjoy humanitarian protection). Geneva law—preferring war crimes prosecutions
over denial of humanitarian protection—is narrowly tailored to punish only bad
actors. That is, the “war crimes” approach targets persons who, with a culpable
mental state, have committed acts causing or risking grave consequences for
protected persons. The “denial of protective status” approach, on the other hand,
punishes an unacceptably broad range of conduct including all acts which would
have the effect of depriving captured persons of protective status.
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The “war crimes” approach is preferable because it emphasizes
culpability. Not all conduct depriving persons of POW status may be classified as
war crimes (and the inverse is obviously false—not all conduct constituting a war
crime would deprive a combatant of POW status). Indeed, the overlap
encompasses only conduct that threatens the humanitarian values of Geneva law.
Two examples illustrate the point. First consider that several categories of persons
accompanying the armed forces—including civilian members of military aircraft
crews, war correspondents, and supply contractors—are entitled to POW status
provided they have express authorization to do so and carry an identification card
documenting this authorization.114 Any such persons captured in battle without
proper identification or without express authorization may well be denied POW
status—although this conduct arguably would not rise to the level of a war crime.
In addition, individual members of a fighting force that systematically violates the
laws of war may well be denied POW status—even if the individual fighter has
not committed and is not complicit in any violations himself. 115 Loss of status, in
short, cannot be equated with culpability. These examples demonstrate that the
“war crimes” approach is a more exacting tool—directing punitive action toward
culpable persons.
The “war crimes” approach also corrects some perverse incentives created
by the “denial of protection” approach. Note first that the example of the lawabiding fighter in the law-disregarding fighting force (described in the previous
paragraph) illustrates this point. Under the “war crimes” approach, the fighter has
some incentive to obey the laws of war, whereas the “denial of protection”
approach assures that he will suffer punitive measures at the hands of the enemy
irrespective of his personal conduct. Moreover, the “denial of protection”
approach might lengthen and intensify conflicts by providing a disincentive to
surrender. As discussed above, military planners and soldiers have long
understood that poor treatment of captured enemy fighters often backfires because
it encourages the enemy to “fight to the death.”116 The important point here is that
the same logic applies to the conduct of all combatants—whether they satisfy the
requirements of POW status or not.
CONCLUSION
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See Geneva Convention III, supra note __, art. 4 (A) (4).
See id. art. 4 (A) (2) (d).
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See, e.g., U.S. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note ___, at ; FLORY,
supra note ___, at ___ (documenting history).
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Humanitarian protection in time of war should not vary by detainee status
category. Through an analysis of the legal situation of unlawful combatants, I
illustrate that (1) protective schemes are converging; and (2) although the
protective significance of POW status is declining, there are some persistent gaps
in coverage. Building on this descriptive base, I provide a comprehensive
normative defense of protective parity. The unique protective significance of
POW status suggests that POWs are systematically, though only modestly, overprotected and unlawful combatants are systematically under-protected. If
protective schemes compromise legitimate security interests, POWs are
systematically over-protected. That is, these security-based claims, if valid, would
apply irrespective of whether the detainees were properly classified as POWs or
not. If humane treatment of the enemy increases battlefield effectiveness (because
poor treatment discourages surrender, encourages reprisals, decreases troop
morale, and decreases political support for the war effort), then unlawful
combatants are systematically under-protected. I also argue that protective parity
is consistent with the principle of distinction. Even if “irregularization”
undermines distinction, the question is how best to encourage fighters to
distinguish themselves from the civilian population. I maintain that protective
status categories are an inefficient way to incentivize individual combatants
because these categories necessarily trade on collective considerations—such as
the organizational characteristics of the fighting force. The rule of distinction
would be better served by an individualized “war crimes” approach that accorded
all fighters substantial humanitarian protection and punished (in accord with basic
requirements of due process) individual bad actors.

34

University of Chicago Law School

Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

20.

Cass R. Sunstein and Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Second-Order Decisions
(November 1999; Ethics, v. 110, no. 1).
Joseph Isenbergh, Impeachment and Presidential Immunity from Judicial Process
(November 1999; forthcoming Yale Law and Policy Review v.18 #1).
Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional? (August 1999; Michigan
Law Review #3).
Elizabeth Garrett, The Law and Economics of “Informed Voter” Ballot Notations
(November 1999, University of Virginia Law Review, v. 85).
David A. Strauss, Do Constitutional Amendments Matter? (November 1999)
Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for Animals (November 1999)
Cass R. Sunstein, Culture and Government Money: A Guide for the Perplexed
(April 2000).
Emily Buss, Without Peers? The Blind Spot in the Debate over How to Allocate
Educational Control between Parent and State (April 2000).
David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle
(June 2000).
Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and
Conditional Consent (May 2000; Pennsylvania Law Review v. 149).
Mary Ann Case, Lessons for the Future of Affirmative Action from the Past of the
Religion Clauses? (May 2001, Supreme Court Review, 2000)
Cass R. Sunstein, Social and Economic Rights? Lessons from South Africa (May,
2000).
Jill Elaine Hasday, Parenthood Divided: A Legal History of the Bifurcated Law
of Parental Relations
Elizabeth Garrett, Institutional Lessons from the 2000 Presidential Election (May
2001).
Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons: Parking and Stopping on
the Commons (August 2001).
Jack Goldsmith, The Internet and the Legitimacy of Remote Cross-Border
Searches (October 2001).
Adrian Vermeule, Does Commerce Clause Review Have Perverse Effects?
(October 2001).
Cass R. Sunstein, Of Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning (November
2001).
Elizabeth Garrett, The Future of Campaign Finance Reform Laws in the Courts
and in Congress, The William J. Brennan Lecture in Constitutional Law
(December 2001).
Julie Roin, Taxation without Coordination (March 2002).

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Geoffrey R. Stone, Above the Law: Research Methods, Ethics, and the Law of
Privilege (March 2002; forthcoming J. Sociological Methodology 2002).
Cass R. Sunstein, Is There a Constitutional Right to Clone? (March 2002).
Emily Buss, Parental Rights (May 2002, forthcoming Virginia Law Review).
David A. Strauss, Must Like Cases Be Treated Alike? (May 2002).
David A. Strauss, The Common Law Genius of the Warren Court (May 2002).
Jack Goldsmith and Ryan Goodman, U.S. Civil Litigation and International
Terrorism (June 2002).
Jack Goldsmith and Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture:
What a Difference Sixty Years Makes (June 2002).
Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions (July
2002).
Elizabeth Garrett, Is the Party Over? The Court and the Political Process (August
2002).
Cass R. Sunstein, The Rights of Animals: A Very Short Primer (August 2002).
Joseph Isenbergh, Activists Vote Twice (November 2002).
Julie Roin, Truth in Government: Beyond the Tax Expenditure Budget
(November 2002).
Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics (November 2002).
Cass R. Sunstein, Conformity and Dissent (November 2002).
Jill Elaine Hasday, The Principle and Practice of Women’s “Full Citizenship”: A
Case Study of Sex-Segregated Public Education (December 2002).
Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and
Economic Guarantees? (January 2003).
Adrian Vermeule, Mead in the Trenches (January 2003).
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle (January 2003).
Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure (February
2003).
Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice
(March 2003).
Emily Buss, Children’s Associational Rights? Why Less Is More (March 2003)
Emily Buss, The Speech Enhancing Effect of Internet Regulation (March 2003)
Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an
Oxymoron (May 2003)
Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron (April 2003)
Eric A. Posner, Transfer Regulations and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (April 2003)
Mary Ann Case, Developing a Taste for Not Being Discriminated Against (May
2003)
Saul Levmore and Kyle Logue, Insuring against Terrorism—and Crime (June
2003)
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies (September
2003)

49.
50.
51.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Two Fallacies of
Interpretive Theory (September 2003)
Cass R. Sunstein, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary
Investigation (September 2003)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the Economics,
Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More
Generally (November 2003)
Jenia Iontcheva, Nationalizing International Criminal Law: The International
Criminal Court As a Roving Mixed Court (January 2004)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy (January 2004)
Adrian Vermeule, Submajority Rules (in Legislatures and Elsewhere) (January
2004)

Jide Nzelibe, The Credibility Imperative: The Political Dynamics of Retaliation in
the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Resolution Mechanism (January 2004)
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Directions in Sexual Harrassment Law: Afterword
(January 2004)
Cass R. Sunstein, Black on Brown (February 2004)
Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and
Polyamorous Existence (February 2004)
Bernard E. Harcourt, You Are Entering a Gay- and Lesbian-Free Zone: On the
Radical Dissents of Justice Scalia and Other (Post-) Queers (February 2004)
Adrian Vermeule, Selection Effects in Constitutional Law (March 2004)
Derek Jinks and David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?
(March 2004)
Derek Jinks and Ryan Goodman, How to Influence States: Socialization and
International Human Rights Law (March 2004)
Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes, Optimal War and Jus Ad Bellum (April 2004)
Derek Jinks, Protective Parity and the Law of War (April 2004)
Derek Jinks, The Declining Significance of POW Status (April 2004)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Unconstitutional Police Searches and Collective
Responsibility (June 2004)
Bernard E. Harcourt, On Gun Registration, the NRA, Adolf Hitler, and Nazi Gun
Laws: Exploding the Gun Culture Wars {A Call to Historians} (June 2004)

